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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper undertook qualitative research to determine the trade policy space for South 
Africa to implement its industrial policy action plan (Ipap). The South African economy was 
transformed from import substitution in the 1970s to export-orientation in the 1980s. The 
apartheid regime failed to develop coherent policies for industrialisation. In the 1990s, there 
was a deliberate government decision as articulated in the GEAR policy to liberalise the 
economy and with regard to trade this is associated with accession to the World Trade 
Organisation and commitments made thereof. In 2007, the country adopted the national 
industrial policy framework to guide its reindustrialisation efforts and subsequently various 
iterations of the Ipap. Therefore, given that a lot of policy space was lost when the country 
joined as the WTO as a developed country, the question is “does South Africa have enough 
policy space to use some of the instruments that were used by successful Asian countries to 
industrialise”. The WTO made some of these instruments illegal. 
 
To analyse policy space, the paper looked at the effect of WTO Agreements on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM), on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), on 
Government Procurement (GPA), as well as the tariff commitments. The study found that 
although SCM has made certain subsidies illegal, other kinds of subsidies are allowed such as 
those for economic development in disadvantaged regions and for rural development. 
Therefore, strategy and packaging of these subsidies for development is important. TRIMS 
was found to have significantly reduced policy space by making a number of instruments on 
foreign direct investment illegal such as enforcing local content as well as export 
requirements. Since South Africa is not party to the GPA, it retains policy space to use 
government procurement to promote industrialisation in the country. In terms of tariffs 
commitment, the study found that there is no “water” between applied and bound rate for a 
number of critical sectors such as textile, clothing, footwear, and furniture. However, other 
important sectors such as automotive and automotive components and white goods still have 
“water” to increase tariff in future as necessary. Therefore, the study concluded that there is 
policy space to implement industrial policy in South Africa but this requires strategy and 
closer look at the WTO rules for flexibility.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background  
  
The majority of the newly industrialised countries (NICs) in East Asia have used industrial 
policy (IP) to promote industrialisation. According to Rodrik (2012), industrialisation, in 
particular manufacturing industries, will bring about structural change that will result in 
unconditional convergence. In departure from neoclassical growth theory, Rodrik maintains 
that countries that manage to effect the requisite structure change will grow rapidly while 
those that fail do not. To this end, Rodrik indicate that what high-growth countries typically 
have in common is their ability to deploy policies that compensate for the market and 
government failures that block growth-enhancing structural transformation. Pack and Saggi 
(2006) defined industrial policy as selective government intervention that attempts to alter the 
structure of production in favour of sectors that are expected to offer better prospects for 
economic growth.  Industrial Policy (IP) is pursued through a number of instruments, which 
amongst others include trade policy as it was the case with the NICs (Valila, 2008).  
 
The establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 led to binding 
commitments on issues such as patents (through WTO Agreement on Trade Related-Aspects 
on Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)), regulation of foreign investment (through WTO 
Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)), trade in services (through 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)) as well as tariff reductions (Chang, 2005). 
Consequently, WTO through its undertakings made illegal some of the policy instruments 
that made the East Asian countries successful (and perhaps also the early industrialisers as 
documented by Chang (2002)) in their industrialisation path.   
 
This led Page (2007) to pose a question, are we ‘kicking away the ladder’ that other countries 
used to develop? Similarly, Chang (2005) argues that “policy space” available for the 
developing countries has shrunk so much that their ability to achieve economic development 
is threatened. Page (2007) described policy space as the scope for domestic policies, 
especially in the areas of trade, investment and industrial development, and how it is framed 
by international commitments as well as global market considerations. Chang (2005) and 
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Shadlen (2005) indicated that, in addition to the WTO, the developed countries have used 
bilateral and regional free-trade agreements (FTAs) and bilateral investment agreements 
(BITs) to impose on developing countries further restrictions that they cannot get accepted in 
the WTO.    
 
In an effort to promote industrialisation, South Africa launched a National Industrial Policy 
Framework (NIPF) in 2007 (the dti, 2007) and several iterations of Industrial Policy Action 
Plans (Ipap) have since been designed, the latest being Ipap III (the dti, 2012). The NIPF 
outlines an industrialisation path for South Africa whilst IPAP 3 identifies specific priority 
sectors. South Africa’s Trade Policy and Strategy Framework states that the country’s trade 
policy is an instrument for the IP (the dti, 2010).   
 
In the past there have been concerns within the National Economic Development and Labour 
Council (NEDLAC) as to whether there is policy space given the existing obligations in the 
WTO (NEDLAC, 2003 & 2006). This was due to the fact that South Africa undertook 
obligations in the WTO as a developed country which translated, amongst others, into deeper 
cuts in tariffs and other commitments. This research will interrogate the extent to which 
South Africa’s international commitments may act as a constraint on the country’s proposed 
industrial policy. 
 
1.2 Research Problem 
 
Following its accession to the WTO in 1994, South Africa has substantially liberalised its 
tariffs (Edwards and Lawrence, 2006). The average applied tariff rate for the South Africa 
was 7.7% in 2010 (WTO, 2011). Further, the WTO statistics shows that the average applied 
tariff rates for agricultural products and non-agricultural goods were 9% and 7.5%, 
respectively. As compared to other BRICS countries, India has the highest applied tariff with 
an average of 31.8% for agriculture, and 10.1% for non-agricultural products. While the 
average applied tariff for Brazil was 10.3% for agricultural, and for non-agriculture 14.2%, 
China (15.6% for agricultural, and for non-agriculture 8.7%), and Russia (13.53% for 
agriculture, and for non-agriculture 8.9%). This shows that South Africa’s tariffs are quite 
low compared to its BRICS partners.  
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In addition, South Africa, due to single undertaking in the WTO1, is signatory to multilateral 
Agreements such as on TRIMs, GATs, TRIPs, and SCM. These show that South Africa has 
undertaken a number of binding commitments in the WTO on patents, regulation on 
investment, and trade in services. South Africa is however not part of the Plurilateral 
Agreement on Government Procurement, which has been described as the most constraining 
for IP prospects by Kattel and Lember (2010)2.   
 
Therefore, the overall question this research attempts to answer is “Does South Africa have 
policy space within WTO to implement its industrial policy”. The specific questions that the 
research will address are as follows, 1) does South Africa have space in its tariff structure to 
increase protection of the IPAP 3 priority sectors; 2) do the rules in the TRIMs permit use of 
certain IP instruments, and 3) does TRIPs provide space for South Africa to acquire the 
technology required in the implementation of IPAP 3. Furthermore, once the study has 
identified potential constraints to implementing industrial policy, it will attempt to find ways 
and means South Africa can better utilize limited policy space within WTO and circumvent 
potential stumbling blocks.  
 
1.3 Hypothesis  
 
The study hypothesises that South Africa’s commitments in the WTO provide the necessary 
space to implement its industrial policy. Whilst the WTO imposes obligations on member 
countries, it does provide sufficient space for developing countries to pursue domestic 
policies in the areas of trade, investment and industrial development. In addition, the WTO 
rules does allow special and differential treatment for developing countries, which bode well 
industrial policy space in South Africa.    
 
1.4 Research Aims and Objectives  
 
There is a perception, amongst some policy makers, academics and civil society 
organizations, that South Africa’s membership of the WTO and its undertaking of 
commitments has severely impacted on the policy space to pursue a developmental agenda, 
                                                          
1
 The “Single Undertaking” designates the obligation of all WTO members to accept and apply all the 
agreements negotiated under the auspices of the organization (Negrescu and Truica, 2006).  
2
 Plurilateral Agreements are those multilateral agreements treaty between a limited number of states with a 
particular interest in the subject of the Agreement but not the whole membership of WTO.  
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(Nedlac, 2003, 2006). As a result, this research attempts to establish whether South Africa 
has the required policy space, from a trade policy perspective, to use policy instruments that 
NICs used to pursue their IP as part of its developmental agenda.   
 
1.5 Research Approach and Method 
 
The project will apply a mix of qualitative-descriptive and quantitative-descriptive 
approaches. In order to test whether there is “water” between applied and bound tariffs for IP 
sectors, the research will analyse South Africa’s tariff book available from the South African 
Revenue Service as well as the country’s commitment schedules in the WTO. This will be 
compared to BRICS countries. To test for IP space in the TRIPS and TRIMS for South 
Africa, the study will analyse relevant WTO Agreements as well as the country’s 
commitment schedules in the WTO. Over and above this, interviews will be conducted with 
relevant South African policy makers as well as the country’s representatives in the WTO in 
Geneva with a view to understanding past, current and future industrial and trade policy 
trajectory.  
 
1.6 Outline of the Study 
 
The study will be arranged as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on Industrial/trade 
policy instruments. This chapter will review literature on various approaches to IP and 
proposed instruments to implement the industrial policy. Emphasis will be on economic 
theory underpinning these approaches. In addition, this chapter will review previous studies 
on policy Space in the WTO on the industrial/trade policy instruments.  
 
Chapter 3 will review official policy documents in South Africa on the NIPF and the 
industrial policy action plan as well as the trade policy in the country. This Chapter will 
review literature on the industrial and trade policy in South Africa from a historical 
perspective. Chapter 4 briefly outlines the research approach and the methodology as well as 
the analysis and results for the study. Chapter 5 provides conclusion and recommendations.  
 
  
5 
 
   
CHAPTER 2 
 
GLOBAL CONTEXT AND DEBATE ON INDUSTRIAL AND TRADE POLICY  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
There is a long-standing realisation on the need for industrialization in developing countries; 
however, the differences have been on the role of the state in the industrialization process. 
The role of the state has been changing over the last seven decades. In the period following 
World Wars and the Great Depression, the role of the state was prominent in developing 
countries and in particular those in Latin America and East Asia. The state used various 
instruments to support the industrialization process and they were not constrained by either 
regional or international agreements. Even in the 1970s in the presence of the GATT 1947, 
these countries still managed to find a way around the prevailing rules.  
 
The 1980s saw the introduction of neoliberal policies which Williamson (1990) termed the 
Washington Consensus and these policies advocated for no or minimal role of the state in the 
economy. Furthermore, there was a surge in international and regional agreements that 
constrained the ability of the state to use IP instruments, used by the NICs, to support their 
industrialization process. However, the financial crisis and economic meltdown that started in 
2008 brought back the discussion on the role of the state in the economy (Palley, 2012).  
 
This lead to the question, do governments have adequate policy space to intervene in the 
economy, how much “policy space” has been eroded by the Washington Consensus policies. 
This is the question that has occupied the minds of a number of researchers and institutions 
over the recent past. This section will first review literature on the definition as well as 
various approaches to the industrial policy. Furthermore, the paper will review literature and 
identify various instruments used to pursue IP in Latin America and East Asia. Lastly, the 
paper will discuss policy space in the WTO to pursue industrial policy.    
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2.2 What is industrial policy? 
 
Rodrik (2004) defines industrial policy as policy that focuses on economic restructuring in 
favour of more dynamic activities located within industry or manufacturing. According to 
Rodrik, industrial policy can trigger industrialisation as envisaged by neoclassical economics. 
Pack and Saggi (2006), and Valila (2008) indicated that IP is “any type of selective 
government intervention or policy that attempts to alter the structure of production in favour 
of sectors that are expected to offer better prospects for economic growth in a way that would 
not occur in the absence of such intervention”. Both definitions indicate that IP is concerned 
with how developing countries can transform their productive capacity to produce products 
associated with high growth. This augurs well with views by Amsden (1997), who argued 
that production should be at the heart of industrialisation process, not exchange. 
 
The reasons and motivations why countries in Latin America and East Asia pursued 
industrialisation are adequately covered by Hunt (1989) and Shapiro (2007) and will not be 
discussed further in this paper.  However, it is worth mentioning that developing countries 
adopted Washington Consensus policies hoping that this will result in convergence in 
income. According to Rodrik (2012), neoclassical growth theory establishes a presumption 
that countries with access to identical technologies should converge to a common income 
level. But as observed by Lall (2004), diverging industrial competitiveness in the developing 
world is one of the basic causes of the growing disparities in income that are now a pervasive 
feature of the world scene. Therefore, industrial policy and industrialisation is important for 
economic development as unconditional convergence occurs in manufacturing industries 
rather the entire economy (Rodrik, 2012). 
 
While there seem to be consensus on the definition of the industrial policy, there are 
differences on what should be the function of this policy and the specific role of the state. The 
next section considers various approaches to industrial policy.  
 
2.3 Approaches to Industrial Policy  
 
Lall (2004) identified two approaches to IP and these include neoliberal and structuralist. 
This paper will situate various discussions on IP under these two approaches.  
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2.3.1 Neoliberal Approach 
 
The views represented by this approach have been changing over the years, from total 
rejection of IP to acknowledgement of the importance of industrial upgrading to economic 
growth and development [Williamson (1990), Stiglitz (1998), Lin and Chang (2009), Wade 
(2010), Lin (2010) and Singh (2012)]. According to Peres (2007), industrial policies 
gradually lost legitimacy over the course of the 1980s due to high debt and balance of 
payment problems. Hence, in the 1980s, the Bretton Woods institutions encouraged 
developing countries to adopt Washington Consensus policies and these policies included 
amongst others, fiscal discipline, reordering public expenditure priorities (to focus on basic 
health and education, and infrastructure), competitive exchange rate, trade liberalisation, 
liberalisation of inward foreign direct investment, privatisation, deregulation as well as 
protection of intellectual property rights (Williamson, 1990). Washington Consensus did not 
foresee any role for government in the economy except to provide essential public goods like 
human capital and infrastructure (Lall, 2004). Markets were considered efficient in allocating 
resources and even if there is market failure, it was assumed that such failure was lower than 
government failure.  
 
Then in the late 1990s, Stiglitz (1998) provided a critique of the Washington Consensus and 
advocated for a move towards post-Washington Consensus. Stiglitz emphasised the role of 
regulatory environment (sound financial markets and competition) as well as the role of 
government to complement markets. He point-out that financial liberalisation and 
privatisation are not necessary conditions for growth but sound regulations of markets as well 
as competition.  
 
Three decades after the Washington Consensus, in 2009, through a debate with Ha-Joon 
Chang [Chang and Lin (2009) and more detailed in Lin (2010)], Justin Lin, the then Chief 
Economist and Senior Vice-President of the World Bank, signalled a departure by the Bank 
from Washington Consensus and acknowledged the importance of industrial upgrading in 
economic growth and development. However, Lin preferred a facilitating state that facilitates 
the private sector’s ability to exploit the country’s current comparative advantage. He 
foresees the role of the state as correcting markets failures such as information externalities 
and coordination problems. Similar to Washington Consensus, Lin indicated that the state 
should intervene with subsidies to encourage innovation in order to deal with informational 
8 
 
externalities and also provide soft and hard infrastructure to deal with coordination problems. 
Further, countries should specialise in sectors in which they have comparative advantage 
(CA).     
 
Rodrik (2004), and Hausmann, et al (2008) favours a government that support firms in their 
self-discovery process of new products by addressing any potential market failures, rather 
than helping firms to exploit current comparative advantage. In this regard, government 
should restrict subsidies to self-discovery in new, non-traditional industries but it should not 
pick winners. Again, Rodrik (2012) noted the importance of manufacturing industries to 
bring about industrialisation.  
 
Singh (2012) while applauding the changing perspectives on IP by the World Bank, argued 
that this represent “one step forward (the approval for the enhanced role of the state) but also 
one if not two steps backward (by strong encouragement to countries to seek their current 
comparative advantage in pursuing industrial policy)”.  
 
2.3.2 Structuralist Approach 
 
This approach has its roots in Latin America following the Great Depression and the World 
Wars and it is associated, amongst others, with scholars such as Raoul Prebisch, Hans Singer, 
Celso Furtado, and Oswaldo Sunkel (Hunt, 1989). It unceremoniously ended in the 1980s due 
to the debt crisis and was then replaced by a neoliberal approach in Washington Consensus. 
However, since the turn of the 21 century, developing countries have been trying to reclaim 
this approach and the global financial crisis followed by the economic meltdown helped fast-
track and legitimise this process.  
 
The structuralist approach favours transformation of the economic structures in developing 
countries from raw-material-and-resource based economies to value-added and industrial 
products based economies (Hunt, 1989). In this regard, policy recommendations entailed 
government intervention to assist the private sector to change these structural characteristics 
through promotion of import-substituting industrialisation (ISI). This approach maintains that 
government interventions are necessary to improve market outcomes. In fact, (Lall, 2004) 
argues that many poor regions that have implemented neoliberal policies recently have not 
experienced the industrial growth or export success that characterized more interventionist 
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economies. In addition, this approach rejects the notion of world division of labour on the 
basis of specialization according comparative advantage. It advocate for defying and creating 
comparative advantage.  
 
According to Ha-Joon-Chang is his debate with Justin Lin (Lin and Chang, 2009), it is simply 
not possible for a backward economy to accumulate capabilities in new industries without 
defying comparative advantage and actually entering the industry before it has the ‘right’ 
factor endowment. However, Chang concede that comparative advantage does offer a useful 
guideline as to how much a country is sacrificing by protecting its infant industries. The more 
countries deviate from their comparative advantage, the more that country will pay in order to 
acquire capabilities in new industries.  
 
Pack and Westphal (1985) indicated that successful East Asian countries pursued dual 
industrialisation policy, which encouraged investments in established industries where there 
was a static CA as well as investments in infant industries where there was a potential for 
dynamically achieving a CA. Similarly, Wade (2010) argued that the East Asian IP 
comprised of two kinds: ‘leading the market’ and ‘following the market’. ‘Leading the 
market’ policy entail the government making an investment decision that the private sector 
would not make, while the ‘following the market’ policy referred to the government 
supporting some of the initiatives of the private firms. Wade noted that a lot of East Asian 
countries’ industrial policies were not the leadership kind but followership aimed at 
accelerating movement in the directions that the private sector wanted to take. Wade 
criticised Lin approach to industrial policy, indicating that it says little about the role of 
government in creating comparative advantage.  Lastly Amsden (2001) debunked the notion 
that industrialisation in East Asian was market-led indicating that these countries had to “get 
the prices wrong” to advance their economic development.  
 
2.4 Nexus between Industrial and Trade Policy 
 
The discussion on the relationship between industrial and trade policy is quite an interesting 
one taking into account the views of orthodox economists on one hand and heterodox 
economists on the other. Both these economists agree that trade policy is an instrument of 
industrial policy and has a potential to bring about industrial upgrading and development but 
significantly disagree on the how part. This section reviews literature from both orthodox and 
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neoclassical, and heterodox school of thoughts on the role of trade policy in industrialisation 
process. It is important to indicate at the onset that the bone of contention between 
neoclassical and heterodox economists is whether to follow or defy CA.  
 
Shafaeddin (2010) summarised key positions of orthodox economists as follows: the free-
market based approach to development; the lack of active government intervention in the 
process of industrialization and development; universal and across-the-board trade 
liberalization; and devaluation. Both Williamson (1990) and Rodriguez-Clare (2005) agree 
that a policy of protecting domestic industries against foreign competition create costly 
distortions that end up penalizing exports and impoverishing the domestic economy. But 
according to Williamson, Washington Consensus does allow strictly temporary protection to 
the infant industries. Similarly, Lin (2010) advocated for a gradualist approach to trade 
liberalization and in the transition period, the state may consider some temporary protection 
to industries that are not consistent with a country’s CA.  
 
On the heterodox side, Shafaeddin (2010) argued that trade policy should be development-
oriented, that is, it should be an integral part of industrial and development strategy. 
According to Shafaeddin, this justifies the use of any relevant policy instrument to protect the 
domestic industries, including tariffs and/or quantitative restrictions, or payments of subsidies 
for particular good. Literature has shown that both developed countries and the newly 
industrialized economies (NIEs), with the exception of Hong Kong, used infant-industry 
protection to industrialize [Shafaeddin (2010), Chang (2002 & 2010), and Lall (2004)]. Ha-
Joon Chang in his book kicking-away the ladder has shown that the developed countries have 
actually practised an infant industry protection in their development path (Chang, 2002).  
 
Most importantly, Shafaeddin indicated that the NIEs also used infant-industry support not 
only for import substitution but also for export promotion. It is widely agreed that the East 
Asian countries used complementary import substitution and export promotion in their 
industrialisation process.  
  
2.5 Policy Space in the WTO for the Industrial Policy Instruments 
 
A number of authors have indicated that the current policy space in the World Trade 
Organisation restrict developing countries in implementing their national developments 
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strategies. Developing countries have to contend with several multilateral agreements that 
were not in existence when the developed countries of today were developing (Pack and 
Saggi, 2006). Rodrik (2004) note that there has been tendency to discipline national 
economic policies through multilateral, regional, or bilateral agreements, and these 
disciplines impose restriction on the ability of developing countries to conduct certain types 
of industrial policies.  
 
The establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995, following the conclusion 
of the Uruguay Round talks in 1994, led to binding commitments on issues such as patents 
and copyrights (through TRIPS), regulation of foreign investment (through WTO Agreement 
on TRIMs), trade in services (through GATS) as well as tariff reductions (Chang, 2005). 
Consequently, WTO through its undertakings has made illegal some of the policy instruments 
that made the East Asian countries successful (and perhaps also the early industrialisers as 
documented by Chang (2002)) in their industrialisation.  UNCTAD (2004) indicated that 
enhanced coherence between national development strategies, on the one hand, and 
international obligations and commitments, on the other, would contribute to the creation of 
an enabling environment for development. In this regard, UNCTAD expressed their concerns 
on the impact of international policies and processes on the scope for implementing national 
development strategies.  
 
2.5.1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
 
Page (2007) and Gibbs (2007) noted that import tariffs can be an important IP instrument, 
which both East Asian NIEs and Latin American countries used to encourage specific 
industries. To this end, Page argues that the single largest loss of policy space take places 
when countries joins GATT or the WTO due to obligation to reduce tariffs. Similarly, Gibbs 
argues that tariff reductions may undermine industrialisation policies in developing countries. 
Nevertheless, Page found that most countries still have the space to use tariff to undertake 
industrial policy. Equally, Shadlen (2005) argued that countries typically bounded their tariffs 
at level significantly higher than actual applied tariffs leaving room to adjust tariffs in support 
of domestic objectives. This implies that, according to Shadlen, tariff reduction due to 
accession to the WTO does not represent a significant impediment to pursuing the IP. 
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2.5.2 Trade Related-Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
 
TRIPS introduced protection on trademarks, copyrights, industrial design, data secrets, and 
patents. Page (2007) indicated that the introduction of rules on patents and copyright in the 
Uruguay Round was probably one of the most important sources of concerns over policy 
space and agrees that TRIPS may have had a more profound restrictive effect on potential 
policy freedom. According to Wade (2003), Japan, Taiwan and South Korea were each 
known as ‘the counterfeit capital of the world in their industrialising time while the US was 
known as a bold pirate of intellectual property’. Similarly, Kumar and Gallagher (2007) 
points-out that developed countries have used lax IPR to benefit from innovations in other 
countries during their process of industrialisation. This implies that both early and late 
industrialisers employed a strategy of reverse engineering and coping technologies developed 
in other countries to industrialise and catch-up. But this is now illegal under TRIPS.  
 
According to Rodrik (2004), and Di Caprio and Amsden (2004), TRIPS currently make it 
virtually impossible to use the strategies mentioned in the preceding paragraph while Wade 
indicated that TRIPS raises significant development obstacles for many countries that the 
earlier developers did not face. Nevertheless, Shadlen (2005) indicates that TRIPS still 
provide countries with policy space for developing countries.  He point out that “by imposing 
stringent rules on disclosure and subsequent granting narrow patents, for example, or by 
allowing for wide-ranging research exceptions, countries can provide local actors with 
opportunities to invest around patents without risking litigation for infringement”.  
 
2.5.3 Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) 
 
Wade (2003), Rodrik (2004), Di Caprio and Amsden (2004), Shadlen (2005) and Shafaeddin 
(2010) agree that TRIMS outlaws key investment regulations that have been at the heart of 
development strategies in NICs. They pointed-out that performance requirements that are no 
longer permissible in the WTO include local content regulations (which obliged foreign 
investors to source some of their inputs locally), trade balancing requirements (which 
required foreign investors to include sufficiently high levels of domestic inputs in exports to 
offset imported inputs) as well as export requirements.  
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Amsden (2001) attributed the success of East Asian NICs to their ability to impose reciprocal 
control mechanisms. In this regard, Mayer (2009) indicated that TRIMS makes it difficult to 
link investment support to export-related disciplines aimed at withdrawing support from 
producers who do not achieve international competitiveness within a pre-defined period. 
According to Shafaeddin, TRIMS prohibit support for infant industry as it obliges the host 
country to treat local and foreign companies equally even though they lack equal capabilities 
 
In practice, Di Caprio and Amsden indicated that potential industrialisers do not claim to be 
significantly affected by the limits imposed by TRIMS as most welcome and are actively 
looking for any development investments. Consequently, Di Caprio and Amsden concluded 
that TRIMS does not yet pose much of a limit on potential industrialisers as none of them has 
reached the stage of having the capacity to use such measures. Furthermore, according to Di 
Caprio and Amsden, “as long as governments lack a clear-cut strategy, the degree of freedom 
in the WTO is redundant”. This view is shared by Kattel and Lember (2010) who indicated 
that developing countries need to develop the policy capacity to take advantage of the 
complex and multi-layered IP space still available under WTO rules. 
 
2.5.4 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) 
 
Di Caprio and Amsden (2004) notes that the strategic use of subsidies was one of the key 
development tools of the last industrialisers and the developed countries before them but 
these are now on the list of actionable subsidies. Rodrik (2004) and Shadlen (2005) indicated 
that export subsidies either directly to exporters or for domestic suppliers of inputs, which 
East Asian NIEs used to industrialise and support their export promotion efforts, are now 
WTO-illegal for all countries with the exception of least developed countries. In addition, 
Rodrik noted that this Agreement essentially render illegal all free trade zones (which in his 
paper he referred to as export processing zones).  
 
Shadlen (2005) and Gibbs (2007) indicated that the SCM also makes provision for some 
subsidies as long as they do not cause serious prejudice to the interest of other countries. 
These include ‘drawbacks” in which countries reimburse firms for the taxes they pay on 
imported goods that are later used in exports, as well as subsidies for the promotion of 
research and development. Shadlen (using a quote from Amsden and Hikino, 2000) asserted 
that “under the guise of science and technology, developing countries can continue to support 
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their own industries, to target national champions for government assistance, and to advance 
the general cause of the national competitiveness”.  
 
However, Di Caprio and Amsden (2004) and Mayer (2009), while they agree with analysis 
by Shadlen, notes that the fiscal cost might be a constraints as some developing countries 
cannot afford to subsidies their firms. Therefore, the issue here is not necessarily of policy 
space but affordability. On the other hand, Kumar and Gallagher (2007) argued that while 
export subsidies were outlawed in the WTO, countries like the US and those in the European 
Union continue to provide substantial export subsidies to their enterprises. This talks to the 
issue of non-compliance by some developed countries.  
 
2.5.5 Regional Trade Agreements 
 
It is a known fact that most RTAs between developed countries and developing countries 
tend to include WTO-plus issues such as investment, government procurement and 
intellectual property rights. As an example, Rodrik (2004) and Shadlen (2005) indicated that 
the U.S has pushed for tighter restrictions in the areas of investment regulations, intellectual 
property rights protection, and capital account whenever they negotiate a free trade 
agreement (FTA) with a developing country. Shadlen argue that the RTAs prohibit 
implementation of industrial strategies that are designed to alter comparative advantage and 
achieve upward mobility in the international economic order.  According to Gibbs (2007), 
some countries use RTAs to impose tighter and more extensive disciplines on a trade partner 
that cannot be achieved in the WTO. This further reduces the policy space for developing 
countries to pursue various kinds of industrial policies.  
 
Page (2007) argued that most policy space is lost outside the WTO, in the RTA when 
countries reduce their applied tariffs to below their commitments in the WTO. On the other 
hand, Di Caprio and Amsden (2004) indicated that some developing countries use RTAs as a 
way of maintaining some of illegal TRIMS instruments such as local content. The RTAs 
concessions are governed by preferential rules of origin, which are usually biased towards a 
home country. That is, countries usually insist on high percentage of local content.  
 
Therefore, RTAs can be an instrument of industrial policy or it can erode the policy space, all 
depend on whether developing have a policy capacity and strategy for development. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO INDUSTRIAL AND TRADE 
POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
3.1 Evolution of the Industrial Policy in Africa 
 
Industrial policy in Africa has occupied the minds of both researchers and policymakers for 
the last five decades. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and 
the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) (2011) indicates that 
industrial development in Africa has gone through three broad phases since independence in 
the 1960s. These include import substitution industrialisation (ISI) phase, structural 
adjustment programme phase, and the poverty reduction strategy paper phase. This paper will 
focus on ISI and SAP phases in Africa.  
 
The ISI phase started in the 1960s and ended in the 1970s. The start of ISI phase coincided 
with the independence of many African countries. Lall and Wangwe (1998) attested that 
industrialisation has been an integral part of African development strategies throughout the 
post-Independence era. This phase involved substantial government support and protection of 
domestic firms from foreign competition through (i) restriction of imports to intermediate 
inputs and capital goods required by domestic industries, (ii) extensive use of tariffs and non-
tariff barriers to trade, and (iii) provision of direct loans to firms, amongst others.     
 
The ISI came to an abrupt end in the late 1970s due to oil prices shocks, decline in 
commodity prices and emerging debt problems. According to UNCTAD and UNIDO (2011), 
Africa countries then sought bail-out from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank (WB). In response, these Bretton Wood Institutions diagnosed problems in the 
continent as poor domestic policies and directed that African countries should adopt 
structural adjustment programme (SAP). However, the SAP did not lead to structural 
transformation and export diversification and African countries continued to be haunted by 
enormous foreign debt accumulated during the ISI phase. Therefore, this debt became an 
impediment to growth and development.  
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The ISI phase coincided with an increase in the share of African manufacturing in gross 
domestic product (GDP) from a low of 6.3% in 1970, to 11.9% in 1980 and 15.3% in 1990 
(UNCTAD and UNIDO, 2011). The second and third phases corresponded with decline in 
the share of African manufacturing in the GDP to 12.8% in 2000 and 10.5% in 2008. Jerven 
(2009) has shown that the GDP indices for African were greater than those of South and East 
Asia in both 1965 and 1970 but it was overtaken in the subsequent period. In 1990, the GDP 
indices were almost half those of East Asia.   On the global front, the share of manufacturing 
in GDP declined from 1.2% in 2000 to 1.1% in 2008. Resource-based manufacturing remains 
the most dominant sector in Africa accounting for 49% in 2009 while medium/high and low 
technology manufacturing accounted for 31% and 20% of the total manufacturing value-
added. According to Lall and Wangwe (1998), this growth in manufacturing, in fact, conceals 
the continued stagnation or falls in manufacturing value-added in many African countries and 
the fact that Africa has suffered the most serious deindustrialisation in recent times in the 
developing world. 
 
Sundaram et al (2011) indicated that structural adjustment and liberalisation in Africa 
weakened the manufacturing sector. They asserted that during the ISI phase, African 
countries were increasingly gaining comparative advantage in labour-intensive manufacturing 
but trade liberalisation prematurely exposed the infant industries to global competition 
against much more mature industries. Similarly, Moudud and Botchway (2007) found that 
trade openness will not guarantee income convergence and growth in Sub-Saharan Africa 
countries and that there is a need to bring back the role of the developmental state in order to 
facilitate the international competitiveness of African countries. Using the experience of 
Ghana, Lall (2005) indicates that this country was the strongest adjuster in Africa and found 
that the adjustment process was followed by relative stagnation and little manufactured 
export diversification. 
 
3.2 Industrial Policy in South Africa 
 
Industrial policy in South Africa underwent a number of changes over the last seven decade 
starting in 1948 when the National Party took over government and implemented the 
apartheid system. In 1994, the new African National Congress (ANC)-led government 
introduced a different approach to IP to facilitate the industrialisation trajectory in South 
Africa. In the beginning of the 21st century, there was some rethinking on the IP and the 
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government decided to adopt some of the experiences from the East Asian newly 
industrialised countries. This resulted in the adoption of the NIPF for the country. This paper 
briefly reviews the three stages of industrialisation in South Africa over the last seven 
decades. The study has divided the stages into three periods, pre-1994 (mainly import 
substitution), post 1994-2006 (Growth-led industrialisation), and post 2007 (industrialisation-
led Growth).  
 
3.2.1 Industrial Policy in the Apartheid Era   
 
According to Newman (2011), South Africa’s prevailing industrial structure has its roots in 
the discovery of minerals such as diamond and gold in the 19th century.  Newman indicated 
that the centrality of mining activities in the South African economy in the turn of the 20th 
century shaped the development of manufacturing sector into activities such as downstream 
mineral processing, engineering, steel and chemical sector, other manufacturing sectors and 
banking.  
 
Industrial policy in South Africa also involved import-substitution particularly in relation to 
inputs for the mining industry (Altman and Mayer, 2003). Further, Altman and Mayer 
indicates that with the intensification of apartheid policies and South Africa’s increasing 
foreign isolation, IP turned to substantial subsidisation of heavy industries such as steel, 
synthetic fuels and the defence industry. However, Altman and Mayer, and Newman argue 
that due to the small size of the economy and poor distribution of income, import-substitution 
opportunities were largely exhausted by the late 1970s.  
 
Fine and Rustomjee (1996) argues that the apartheid regime failed to develop coherent 
policies for industrialisation. While Green (2009) pointed-out some weaknesses of 
industrialisation under the apartheid system and these included policies that caused the South 
African industry sector to be dominated by large firms that relied on subsidies and suppressed 
small and medium enterprises, and no investment were made to develop the human capital of 
the majority of the population. In addition, Altman and Mayer indicates that apartheid laws 
repressed African entrepreneurship. In summing-up IP under the apartheid regime, Chang 
(1997) indicated that IP was burdened with many objectives that ultimately undermined its 
viability in the long run and these objectives included building up of Afrikaner capital, job 
creation of Afrikaner workers, military objectives, evasion of international sanctions, and the 
18 
 
satisfaction of the aspirations of the elite consumers to imitate the consumption patterns of 
the most advanced economies.  
       
3.2.2 Growth-led Industrialisation 
 
The new ANC-led government adopted three important policies between 1994 and 2006, and 
these include Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR), and the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa 
(AsgiSA). According to Altman and Mayer (2003), these policies marked a radical departure 
from previous IP under the apartheid regime. Newman (2011) indicates that RDP did not 
focus on the industrial structure or its transformation and everything was left to the market. 
She pointed-out that RDP focused on increasing rates of investment and expected that this 
will result in higher growth rate and in turn, the higher growth rate will result in equal 
distribution of income and wealth.   
 
In 1996, Government launched its macroeconomic strategy in GEAR (National Treasury, 
1996). Policies covered under GEAR, amongst others, included fiscal policy, monetary and 
exchange rate policy, trade, industrial and small enterprise policies. GEARS favoured a shift 
away from demand-side interventions such as tariffs and subsidies to supply-side measures 
designed to lower unit costs and expedite progress up the value chain (National Treasury, 
1996). Altman and Mayer (2003) describe demand-side interventions as those that increase 
the demand for the output of particular industrial sectors and import-substitution 
industrialisation is an example of this kind of interventions. While supply-side interventions 
are those that enhance the productive capacity and competitiveness of firms. Based on these 
descriptions, South Africa made a U-turn from import-substitution through protectionist 
policies to enhancing productive capacity and competitiveness of domestic firms supported 
by trade liberalisation. To a large extend, South Africa embraced Washington Consensus 
policies.    
 
The then Deputy President of the Republic, Ms Phumzile Ncguka, launched AsgiSA in 2006 
and its main objective was to close the gap between the “first” and “second” economy, and to 
promote the emergence of the black capitalist through Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment.  AsgiSA, like GEAR, focused more on the supply-side activities such as 
investment in infrastructure, and skills and education initiatives (Newman, 2011). Edwards 
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and Lawrence (2006) argued that it was striking that trade performance per se was not 
mentioned as a major constraints to growth in AsgiSA.  
 
Nevertheless, the IP pursued during this period did not leave up to expectations that included 
diversification of the economy, reduction in unemployment as well as poverty reduction. This 
led to rethinking of the IP to address challenges of the 21st century in South Africa. To this 
end, Chang (1997) argues that “South Africa at the moment needs, and it committed to, a 
major industrial restructuring and this requires a more active industrial policy….” Chang 
recommended that any future IP has to include some level of targeting, going through a 
“Scandinavian road” (of developing products “nearby” their natural endowment”), and 
creating comparative advantage in other high-technological products. Further, Chang argues 
that South Africa should pursue an IP in which supply-side measures work hand-in-hand with 
demand-side measures.   
 
3.2.3 Industrialisation-led Growth 
 
In 2007, the South African Government adopted a NIPF, which signalled a departure from 
laissez faire policies under the GEAR (the dti, 2007). The objectives of the NIPF amongst 
others include facilitating diversification beyond current reliance on traditional commodities 
and non-tradable services, and promotion of broad-based and labour-absorbing 
industrialisation. According to the dti (2007), the core objective of the NIPF was to set-out 
government’s approach to industrialisation trajectory and help align both private sector and 
public sector efforts. This implies that South Africa adopted views expressed by Rodrik 
(2004) and Hausmann et al (2010) that IP should be a negotiated process between the private 
and public sector. Furthermore, the NIPF aims to support the process of ‘self-discovery’ in 
developing and strengthening the sector strategies.  
 
In order to implement the NIPF, each year the dti develop and launch a revised three-year 
rolling Ipap with a ten year outlook.  The South African Government, through the 
Department of Trade and Industry, developed and launched the first Ipap in 2007 for the 
financial year 2007/08 and the latest Ipap is for the financial year 2012/13.  
 
The key sectors that are prioritised in the Ipap 2012/13 have been clustered into three groups 
(the dti, 2012). Cluster 1 covers new areas of focus and include sectors such as boatbuilding, 
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agro-processing, green and energy-saving industries, and upstream oil and gas. Metal 
fabrication, capital and transport equipment sector have been added to Cluster 1 but with 
respect to large public sector investments. Cluster 2 covers existing Ipap sectors such as 
automotive products and components, plastic, pharmaceuticals and chemicals, clothing, 
textiles, footwear and leather, forestry, paper, pulp and furniture, etc. Cluster 3 covers sectors 
with potential for long-term advanced capabilities such as nuclear, advanced materials, 
aerospace, defence and electrotechnical and ICT.  
 
The instruments to implement the Ipap 2012/13 include, amongst others, on the supply-side 
interventions such as incentive programmes like manufacturing competitiveness enhancement 
programme (MCEP) and industrial financing mainly through the Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC). The demand-side interventions include preferential procurement policy 
framework Act (PPPFA) and developmental trade policies. Other interventions include those 
focused on skills and innovation policies and stimulating sub-regional growth. The focus on 
this paper will be on supply-side and demand-side interventions as they relate to trade policy 
instruments under the WTO.  
 
3.3 Trade Policy in South Africa 
 
There is quite overwhelming evidence and consensus amongst researchers and policy makers 
that trade policy is an important instrument of industrial policy. South Africa, like all other 
countries globally, have used trade policy to pursue industrial development and 
diversification in the country. This section provides an overview of trade policy in South 
Africa in the 1970s, prior to 1994, and Post 1994. The interest here is to understand various 
policy instruments that South Africa used and/or will use to pursue its industrialisation 
objectives.  
 
3.3.1 Trade Policy in the Apartheid South Africa 
 
Prior to the 1994s, South Africa pursued its import substitution programme behind a tariff 
wall with quantitative restrictions (QRs) on imports [Cassim et al, 2004 and Edwards et al 
(2009)]. Due to exhaustion of the import substitution (IS) in the 1970s, South Africa then 
complemented the IS with effort to promote exports [Newman (2011), Cassim et al (2004)]. 
To this end, South Africa introduced export incentives to counter the effects of distance from 
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markets and the influx of subsidised exports from other countries (Cassim et al, 2004). In 
addition, they indicated that South Africa replaced the QRs with equivalent tariffs and other 
duties. In the 1980s, South Africa changed the publication of a positive list (which specified 
items needing no approval for importation) to a negative list of items that needed approval 
prior to importation. This indicates that South Africa, whilst maintaining import protection, 
pursued a number of efforts to promote exports by providing incentives. 
 
An important development in the early 1990s was the introduction of General Export 
Incentive Scheme to help exports offset the price disadvantage exporters faced in 
international markets (Cassim et al, 2004). The exports with higher value-addition and 
domestic content qualified for a higher subsidy and the opposite applied to exports with low 
value-addition and local content.  
 
3.3.2 Trade Policy in the Democratic South Africa  
 
According to Edwards et al (2009), South Africa undertook an important shift in 
development strategy from export promotion with import controls to greater openness 
through tariff liberalisation. In 1994, South Africa became a founding member of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) and undertook commitments under the single undertaking rule, in 
which the country acceded to all multilateral agreements. The South African Government 
took a decision to make its offer to the WTO as a developed country, which resulted in 
deeper cuts in tariffs and commitments. Why South Africa made commitments as a 
developed country warrant another debate, which will not be pursued in this paper but there 
were some debate between Minister of Trade and Industry in South Africa, Dr. Rob Davies 
and the then University of Cape Town Professor Mills Soko on the subject3.   
 
According to Cassim et al (2004), South Africa’s offer to the WTO consisted of a five-year 
tariff reduction and rationalisation programme aimed at reducing a number of tariff categories 
from over hundred to six. In addition, average weighted duties were to be reduced from 34% 
to 17% for consumption goods, 8% to 4% for intermediate goods, and 11% to 5% for capital 
goods. This indicates that South Africa pursued greater trade liberalisation. Appendix 1 
shows the tariff phase-down under the WTO.  
                                                          
3
 Business Day, March 10th, 2011
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Appendix 2 shows the tariff profile for South Africa between 2002 and 2009 while for more 
historic data Flatters and Stern (2007) shows the structure of SACU tariffs between 1990 and 
2004. The dti (2012a) indicated that South Africa’s average tariff declined from around 23% 
in the 1990s to 7.7% in 2010. The average tariff for agriculture declined from 9.6% in 2002 
to 9% in 2010 and for non-agricultural products from 11.6% to 7.5% in the same period. 
Most importantly, 56.3% of South Africa’s 7,240 tariff lines (HS6 level) were zero-rated in 
2012. In addition, the tariff regime in South Africa was simplified from a tariff schedule 
consisting of 13, 609 tariff lines in 1990, of which 28% were subject to import controls, to 6, 
767 tariff lines and no import controls in 2006.  
 
Gonzalez-Nunez (2008) indicates that the highest tariff reduction occurred in sectors such as 
clothing, footwear, beverages, motor vehicles, textiles, printing, plastic products, and metal 
products. Nevertheless, Cassim et al (2004), Edwards and Lawrence (2006), Flatters and 
Stern (2007) and Edwards et al (2009) argued that the effective rate of protection was still 
higher in South Africa and warranted further tariff reform. Nevertheless, they admit that the 
political and economic will for further comprehensive trade reform by government is not 
strong.  
 
In addition to tariff reductions, South Africa had to eliminate quotas, export subsidies and 
import surcharges (Gonzalez-Nunez, 2008). Gonzalez-Nunez (2008) and Edwards et al 
(2009) asserted that South Africa phased-out its export subsidies under the GEIS in 
accordance with WTO commitments but introduced WTO-compatible supply-side incentives 
such as the now defunct Motor Industry Development Programme (MIDP) for the automotive 
industry as well as the Clothing and Textile Competitiveness Improvement Programme 
(CTCIP), which replaced the Duty Credit Certificate Scheme (DCCS). However, she noted 
that the compatibility of the MIDP to WTO has been questioned.  The MIDP has now been 
replaced by the Automotive Production and Development Programme.  
 
When South Africa made commitments to the WTO in 1996, the country did not have either 
a trade policy or industrial policy. Following the launch of the NIPF in 2007, Gonzalez-
Nunez (2008) indicates that there were calls for the country to have its trade and industrial 
policies more closely alighned. She pointed-out that trade policy need to be reinforced by 
clear industrial policy.  
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In 2010, South African Government adopted a Trade Policy and Strategy Framework (TPSF 
2010) and this framework is government’s way of aligning the trade policy and the IP (the 
dti, 2010). However, the TPSF address only the tariff reform and ignore other important 
trade-related policies such as on government procurement, investment, subsidies or 
incentives, etc. According to the dti (2012b), the TPSF 2010 set the tone for South Africa’s 
tariff policy by stipulating that all reform would be pursued strategically to support industrial 
development. Further, the dti (2012b) argues that tariff reductions undertaken since 1994 had 
not induced the necessary structural changes in the economy to significantly alter the export 
basket beyond the range of products that reflect South Africa’s static comparative advantage.  
 
In contrast to the view that the country must simplify its tariff schedule, the dti argues that 
South Africa’s tariff regime is open, transparent and not overly complex. In addition, the 
department maintain that where tariffs have been reduced, the affected sectors have 
experienced growth in import volumes. Therefore, in order to support industrial development 
and diversification in the country, tariff setting will be decided primarily on a sector-by-
sector basis, dictated by the needs and imperatives of the sector strategies. This point was 
also reiterated in the Ipap 2012/13.  
 
According to the dti, “[a]s a general guideline, tariffs on mature upstream input industries 
could be reduced or removed to lower the input costs for the downstream, more labour 
creating manufacturing sectors. Tariffs on downstream industries, particularly those that are 
strategic from an employment or value-addition perspective, may be retained or raised to 
ensure long-term sustainability and job creation in the context of domestic production 
capabilities/potentialities and the degree of trade and production distortions on these products 
at the global level”. This respond to the views around anti-export bias as well as high 
effective protection rates in that Government will work to reduce tariffs on intermediate 
inputs in order to increase international competitiveness of exports abroad. To this end, the 
dti (2012a) indicated that now trade policy and IP are closely alighned.  
 
The dti (2012b) indicates that, informed by the alignment of trade and industrial policies, 
South Africa has since the onset of the Global Recession in 2008 introduced higher duties on 
137 lines (mainly textiles and clothing); introduced 10 rebates; while tariffs on 9 lines have 
been reduced. Therefore, the dti argues the policy space for tariff sequencing is important in 
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order to build industrial capacity, promote technological investment and upgrading, and 
stimulate competitiveness. 
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CHAPTER 4  
 
IS THERE POLICY SPACE TO PURSUE INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN SOUTH 
AFRICA?  
4.1 Research Approach and Method 
 
This research applied a mix of qualitative-descriptive and quantitative-descriptive 
approaches. The study relied on available official policy documents as well as tariff data 
available from official sources. This approach represents the best way to both analytically and 
quantitatively answer the question regarding possible policy space. In order to test whether 
there is “water” between applied and bound tariffs for the sectors identified in the industrial 
policy action plan III, the research analysed the South Africa’s tariff book available from the 
South African Revenue Service as well as the country’s commitment schedules in the WTO 
in 1994 available from the dti.  
 
To test for IP space in TRIMS, GPA as well as SCM for South Africa, the study analysed 
relevant WTO Agreements. Over and above this, interviews were conducted with relevant 
South Africa policy makers responsible for trade policy. There was an effort to consult with 
business and labour, but due to the December-January holidays, they did not respond to the 
questioner sent to them. However, the information and data available was sufficient to 
complete the research. Furthermore, the official responsible for IPR at the dti could not 
respond to the questionnaire due to other work commitments. As a result, evaluation of policy 
space under TRIPS was excluded from the analysis.   
 
4.2 The Level of Manufacturing in South Africa 
 
Table 1 below indicate that manufacturing value-added (MVA) per capita in South Africa 
increased from 551 in 1990 to 581 in 2010, which represent compound annual growth rate of 
0.3%. If MVA is accepted as a measure for industrialisation, then this indicate that South 
African has been industrialising albeit at a low rate. MVA is dominated by resource-based 
manufacturing (RBM) which accounted for 52% of the total MVA in the country. This is 
followed by 31% for medium and high technology manufacturing (MHT) and 17% for low 
technology manufacturing. The UNIDO and UNCTAD Report (2011) indicate that while 
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RBM can contribute to higher growth rates, they involve low value-addition and can make 
countries vulnerable to external price shocks. Therefore, there is a need for South Africa to 
move-up the value chain and increase its share of MHT manufacturing.  
 
Table 1: South Africa’s Manufacturing Performance 
 Manufacturing value-added (MVA) per capita (1990) 551 
MVA per capita (2010) 581 
MVA per capita (Compound annual growth rate 1990-2010) 0.3 
Resource-based (RB) manufacturing share of MVA (2009) 52 
Low Technology (LT) manufacturing share of MVA (2009) 17 
Medium and High technology (MHT) manufacturing share of 
MVA (2009) 31 
Source: UNIDO and UNCTAD Report (2011) 
 
4.3 Tariff Analysis on Priority Sectors Identified in the IPAP  
 
The analysis on sectors and subsectors prioritised in the industrial policy action 2012/13-
2014/15 will focus on automotive and automotive components, clothing, textile, and 
footwear, furniture, white goods industry, and boatbuilding and associated services industry. 
These sectors were selected because Ipap identified growth of imports as a constraint as well 
as based on media reports about manufacturers indicating that tariffs are too low for some of 
these sectors.  
 
With regard to the clothing, textile, footwear and leather sector, tariffs on imports have been a 
major issue, which in the past prompted the South African Government to request China to 
undertake voluntary restraints on its exports. Amongst constraints identified in the Ipap 
relating to the white good industry include the high volume of imports (the dti, 2012a:61). 
Although Ipap intent to reduce import duties on intermediate and manufactured inputs for the 
boatbuilding sector to increase competitiveness in export markets, this paper will only be 
limited to the final products, which are boats and yachts. 
 
Although agro-processing is identified as a priority sector, the dti indicated that agro-
processing face constraints that are related to developed-country trade policy such as 
subsidies, tariffs, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures (the dti, 2012a:75). Therefore, the 
constraints on agro-processing are not on imports but exports.  As a result, this sector was 
excluded from the analysis.  
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Table 2: The Difference between Applied and Bound Tariff Rates on Selected Sectors 
  
Auto 
Parts Vehicles 
White 
Goods Boats Clothing Textiles 
Foot
wear 
Furnit
ure 
Number Tariff lines 62 68 49 5 333 633 57 50 
No. less than 5% 2 13 4 5 192 438 35 34 
No. between 5% & 10% 29 0 10 0 104 69 0 0 
No. between 11% & 15% 0 0 10 0 19 2 1 0 
No. between 16% & 20% 11 0 16 0 4 61 5 16 
No. between 21 & 25% 2 28 0 0 1 54 0 0 
No. greater than 25% 18 27 9 0 13 9 6 0 
Average applied rate (%) 12 21 9 10 26 15 14 13 
Average bound rate (%) 30 50 25 10 42 21 20 20 
Average "water" level (%) 18 23 17 0 16 7 6 7 
Source: Own calculations based on data from SARS and the dti 
a. Automotive parts falls under chapter 8703 of the tariff book 
b. Vehicle 8703 
c. White good industry – Chapters 73.21, 84.18, 84.21, 84.22.1, 8450. The bound rate for tariff 
lines was less than applied. 
d. Boats – 8903 
e. Clothing – chapter 61-63 
f. Textile - chapter 50 – 60 
g. Footwear – chapter 64 
h. Furniture – chapter 94 
Note: non-ad-valorem duties were excluded from the calculations.  
 
The average applied tariff for automotive parts (AP) was 12% while the average bound rate 
was 30%, yielding average “water” level of 18%. The applied tariff for AP ranged from 5% 
to 30%. Therefore, there is “space” to exercise the tariff policy to protect the AP industry if 
need arises. For vehicles, the average applied tariff was 21% and the average bound rate was 
50%, leaving out an average of 23% of “water” level between the applied and bound rate. 
The applied tariffs for vehicles ranged zero-rated to 25%.  
 
The average applied tariff for white goods was 9% while the average bound rate was 25%, 
yielding average “water” level of 17%. The applied tariff for white goods ranged from 10% 
to 30%. For boats, the average applied tariff was 10% and the average bound rate was 10%, 
leaving out no “water” level between the applied and bound rate. For clothing, the average 
applied tariff was 26% and the average bound rate 42% yielding average ‘water’ level of 
16%. The applied tariffs ranged from 0 to 45%. The average applied tariff for textiles was 
15% while the average bound rate was 21% leaving out an average of 7% to increase tariffs.  
For textiles, the applied tariffs ranged from 0 to 30%.  
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For furniture industry, the average applied tariff was 14% while the average bound rate was 
20%, yielding average “water” level of 6%. The applied tariff for furniture ranged from 0% 
to 20%. The average applied tariff for footwear was 13% and the average bound rate was 
20%, leaving out an average of 7% of “water” level between the applied and bound rate. The 
applied tariffs for footwear ranged zero-rated to 30%.  
 
Table 2 indicate that a significant number of tariff lines in the clothing, textile and footwear 
industry and furniture industry have the “water’ level either zero or less 5%. Analysis at HS6 
level has revealed that for some clothing and textile lines, applied tariffs are equal to bound 
rates. This shows that for some of tariff lines of significant importance to South Africa there 
might not be policy space to use tariffs to protect “infant industries”. 
 
4.4 Compatibility of Incentives in South Africa to the WTO Rules  
 
4.4.1 Industrial Development Zones 
 
Tang (2008) defined IDZ as an insulated export area strategically linked to a port or airport, 
and offers fiscal and non-fiscal incentives to industrialists to make their export internationally 
competitive. Similarly, the dti (2012c) indicated that the purpose of the IDZ programme was 
to promote export-oriented manufacturing and service industries in order to accelerate 
economic growth and employment creation. Since 2001, South Africa implemented an 
industrial development zones programme and currently have four IDZs, namely, Coega IDZ, 
East London IDZ, Richards Bay IDZ and OR Tambo IDZ, although some are not operational. 
The South African Revenue Services offered incentives to the IDZs such as relief from 
custom duties to any goods for storage, raw material for manufacture or machinery used in 
the manufacturing process as well as tax credits4.  
 
McCallum (2011) indicated that different countries use different names to refer to EPZ.  In 
his study, McCallum found that three of the four cases do not always use EPZ as the 
preferred title, opting instead for “special economic zones” (China), “industrial development 
zone” (South Africa), and “maquiladora” (Honduras). McCallum indicated that export 
                                                          
4
 South African Revenue Service - Industrial Development Zone, www.sars.gov.za/home.asp?pid=44747, 
accessed 20/12/2012 
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processing zones (EPZs) are special regulatory areas within countries established to promote 
export-led growth. This implies that IDZs or EPZs are subsidies manufacturing for export 
purposes.  
 
The incentives given to firms located in the IDZs can be interpreted as export subsidies in 
line with Article 3a&b and also Annex I of Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures if custom duties on imports are exempted on conditions that value is added to those 
products (imports) and then they be exported. In addition, Article 3b prohibits subsidies 
contingent upon use of domestic over imported product. McCallum (2011) affirmed that the 
regulatory conditions that characterize EPZs are often in violation of, and fundamentally 
incompatible with, the recommendations of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM).  Furthermore McCallum indicate that this incompatibility 
with WTO rules has not deterred the governments of developing nations from pursuing EPZs 
because an export-oriented growth strategy is often seen as the only palliative to lagging 
economic growth.  
 
However, writing under correction, no country has been taken to WTO for IDZs or export 
processing zones (EPZs). Tang (2008) indicated that there were 3500 zones in 130 countries 
globally in 2006. Of these, only 2.6% are in sub-Saharan Africa and 25.7% in Asia. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that South Africa can be taken to WTO for implementing SEZs or 
IDZs as the country is in the same boat as many developing countries.  
 
4.4.2 Aquaculture Development and Enhancement Programme (ADEP) 
 
According to the dti programme guidelines, the Aquaculture Development and Enhancement 
Programme (ADEP) is an incentive programme that offers a reimbursable cost-sharing grant 
of up to a maximum of R40 million qualifying costs in machinery and equipment; bulk 
infrastructure; owned land and/or buildings; leasehold improvements; competitiveness 
improvement activities and commercial vehicles and work boats. 
 
In order to qualify for the ADEP grant, a project must meet economic benefit criteria, which 
amongst other include own capital investment, job creation, geographical spread and 
contribution to broad-based black economic empowerment. This programme constitutes a 
subsidy as defined in Article 1 & 2 of the SCM. Then the next question is whether this 
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subsidy is actionable or non-actionable. Article 8.2 (b) indicate that subsidies that provide 
“assistance to disadvantaged regions within the territory of a member given pursuant to a 
general framework of regional development and non-specific shall be non-actionable”. One 
of the criteria for ADEP is an aquaculture establishment in areas with unemployment above 
25%. Therefore, it can be argued that the ADEP programme is meant to provide assistance to 
disadvantaged region, hence non-actionable. To this end, this shows that the WTO rules 
provide trade policy space for South Africa to pursue its IP goals.    
 
4.4.3 Automotive Investment Scheme (AIS) 
 
The Automotive Investment Scheme (AIS) provide incentives designed to grow and develop 
the automotive sector through investment in new and/ or replacement models and 
components that will increase plant production volumes, sustain employment and/ or 
strengthen the automotive value chain. The AIS provides for a taxable cash grant ranging 
from 20 to 40% of the value of qualifying investment in productive assets as approved by the 
dti.  
 
In order to qualify for this programme, the project must meet the economic benefit 
requirements that amongst others include substantial support for the development of the local 
vehicle related tooling industry, spend at least 5% of the value of the investment project on 
applied research and development, design in the country, employment creation, strengthen 
automotive supply chain, and substantial increase in local content with respect to value 
addition of products. Based on these criteria, it seems the emphasis is on local content, which 
is prohibited under TRIMS. To the knowledge of the author, so far no country has expressed 
concern of the AIS. This is because most automotive producing countries provide incentive 
and attach certain conditions which may or may not include local content and export 
performance.  
 
Therefore, legally speaking, TRIMS can constrain implementation of national development 
strategies but in practice countries have found a leeway around TRIMS.  
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4.4.4 Manufacturing Competitiveness Enhancement Programme (MCEP) 
 
The MCEP is an incentive programme introduced by South Africa through the Department of 
Trade and Industry aimed to support manufacturing enterprises with competitiveness 
improvement interventions. This programme consists of the following components: the 
production incentive grants and industrial financing loan facilities. The production incentive 
grants support capital investment, green technology and resource efficiency improvement, 
enterprise-level competitiveness improvement, feasibility studies, and cluster competitiveness 
improvement. The industrial financing loan facilities cover pre/post-dispatch working capital 
facility as well as IP niche projects fund. The objective of the pre/post-dispatch working 
capital facility is to offer finance to manufacturers at a preferential interest rate that will lead 
to improved competitiveness by reducing the cost of finance. While the IP niche project fund 
cover projects identified as strategic that otherwise could not be financed by the commercial 
banks or the Industrial Development Bank.  
 
The grants and preferential interest rates offered under MCEP constitute subsidy to the 
industry. According to the NIPF, “the industrial financing will be customised to addressing 
specific opportunities and constraints, within the disciplines of the WTO rules. Consequently, 
WTO provisions on amongst others subsidies will frame the types of industrial financing that 
is possible”. The MCEP can be justified under Article 8.2 (c) as non-actionable due to the 
support being made available to all firms that adopt new equipment and/or production 
processes. The WTO rules provide a number of loopholes for countries to exploit “if they 
have a strategy” as articulated by Di Caprio and Amsden.  
 
4.4.5 Export Marketing and Investment Assistance Scheme (EMIA) 
  
The aim of the Export Marketing and Investment Assistance (EMIA) scheme is to develop 
export markets for South African products and services and to recruit new foreign direct 
investment into the country. This programme is a critical instrument of the IPAP in order to 
promote South Africa’s industrial exports in line with the NIPF. EMIA provide grants that 
cover individual exhibition participation, primary market research and FDI, and individual 
inward missions. To qualify, the beneficiaries have to be South African entities. This 
programme does not include elements prohibited in Annex I of SCM and it is compliant to 
WTO rules.   
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4.5 Is Localisation Permitted under TRIMS  
 
The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures prohibits any TRIM that is 
inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or Article II of GATT 1994. These, amongst 
others, include local content requirements, trade balancing requirements as well as export 
requirements. South Africa currently does not impose any local content on FDI and therefore 
the country is in compliance with WTO rules under TRIMS. Local content requirements are 
only implemented with respect to government procurement, which is governed by Agreement 
on Government Procurement.  
 
However, South Africa cannot embark on industrialisation process along the lines of the East 
Asian countries as the ladder has been pulled below it. The country is currently promoting 
inward investment but cannot insist on local content requirements or compel firms to export 
some of their products. But, Shadlen (2004) indicated that foreign firms do not have “right of 
establishment”, as a result countries can put some restrictions. The case of Wal-Mart versus 
the State in South Africa has provided some lessons that these TRIMS need to be read in 
conjunction with other WTO Agreements such as GATS. South Africa’s offer to WTO under 
GATs provided Wal-Mart with “right of establishment” and as a result Government is unable 
to set any threshold for local content.   
 
Therefore, for South Africa, it can be concluded that TRIMS prohibit instruments that the 
country could use in its industrialisation process. The country has IP framework or strategy 
but instruments to pursue it are limited.   
 
4.6 Can South Africa Rely on Government Procurement as Instrument of IP? 
 
South Africa views public procurement lever as a critical instrument for the success of the 
IPAP across a range of sectors (the dti 2012a: 39). In an effort to aligning public 
procurement, South Africa adopted Amended Regulations to the Preferential Procurement 
Policy Framework Act (PPPFA) in December 2011. The PPPFA enables the country to 
designate some sectors or subsectors for local procurement and binds all government 
departments and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as gazetted by the Minister of Finance on 08 
June 2011 (Government Gazette No. 34350). Subsequently, the Department of Trade and 
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Industry designated some sectors for local procurement. Table 3 provide the current list of 
designated sectors.  
 
Table 3: Sectors and Subsectors designated under the PPPFA 
Industry/sector/sub-sector Minimum threshold for local content 
Buses (Bus Body)  80% 
Textile, Clothing, Leather and Footwear 100% 
Steel Power Pylons  100% 
Canned / Processed Vegetables 80% 
Pharmaceutical Products: OSD Tender  70% (volumes) 
Rail Rolling Stock 65% 
Set Top Boxes (STB) 30% 
Source: the dti (2013)5 
  
In addition, the dti is still considering designating other industries, sectors and sub-sectors. 
Companies, local or foreign, that want to take advantage of government tender relating to 
designated sectors, have to meet the relevant minimum threshold for local content. This 
demonstrates that the South Africa is using government procurement to promote localisation.  
 
Then the questions becomes whether government procurement is permitted under the WTO 
rules. The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) is a plurilateral trade 
agreement, and not part of single undertaking in 1994. This implies member states elect 
whether or not to join the GPA and it only applies to those member states. South Africa is not 
a member state to the GPA and as a result it can use government procurement to promote 
industrialisation in the country through localisation. Therefore, being not a member state to 
the GPA provides South Africa with the trade policy space to pursue its IP action plan.     
 
  
                                                          
5
 Accessed on 09 January 2013, http://www.thedti.gov.za/industrial_development/ip.jsp  
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CHAPTER 5  
 
CONCLUSION REMARKS: POLICY SPACE AVAILABLE IN THE WTO 
 
There is an emerging realisation on the need for industrialization in developing countries; 
however, the differences have been on the role of the state. The role played by the state has 
been changing over the last seven decades. In the period following World Wars and the Great 
Depression, the role of the state was prominent in the development process in developing 
countries and in particular those in Latin America and East Asia as well as in the African 
Continent. The state used various instruments to support the industrialization process and 
they were not constrained by either regional or international trade agreements. Even in the 
1970s in the presence of the GATT 1947, these countries managed to find a way around the 
prevailing rules.  
 
The 1980s saw the introduction of neoliberal policies and approach to IP which Williamson 
(1990) termed Washington Consensus and this policies advocated for no or minimal role of 
the state in the economy. Furthermore, there was a surge in international and regional trade 
agreements that constrained the ability of the state to use IP instruments, used by early and 
late developers, to support their industrialization process. However, the financial crisis and 
economic meltdown that started in 2008 brought back the discussion on the role of the state 
in the economy. 
 
There are no disputes that trade policy is and remains an important instrument of industrial 
policy. The literature indicated that successful East Asian economies used trade policy 
instruments such as selective protection (high tariffs, quotas, import licencing), stringent 
domestic content requirements, sub-contracting promotion, and selectivity on FDI, to develop 
their economies. However, the establishment of the WTO in 1995 introduced some rules and 
led to binding commitments on issues such as patents and copyrights  (through TRIPS), 
regulation of foreign investment (through TRIMs), trade in services (through GATS), 
regulation on subsidies (through SCM) as well as tariff reductions. Consequently, WTO 
through these undertakings made illegal some of the policy instruments that made the East 
Asian countries (and perhaps also the early industrialiser) successful. This led to some 
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authors posing a question, ‘are we kicking away the ladder’ that other countries used to 
develop?  
 
Most African countries, following their independence in the 1950s and 1960s, pursued ISI 
path. However, due to a number of factors, key among them debt crisis, these countries had to 
abandon their industrialisation ambitions and adopt the Washington Consensus policies. As a 
result, most African countries do not have IP while some have recently introduced them. 
 
In South Africa, pre-1994, the apartheid government pursued an import substitution through 
state-owned enterprises behind a tariff wall, subsidies, quotas, amongst others. Enterprises 
with greater domestic content received more protection and support. International sanctions 
against the apartheid government also forced the country to look inward for development. 
Fine and Rustomjee indicated that the apartheid regime failure to develop a coherent policy 
towards industrialisation. Following the democratic elections in 1994, South Africa pursued 
neoliberal policies through adoption of Washington Consensus policies. The country adopted 
GEAR in 1996 and there was little emphasis on industrial policy. South Africa had to wait 
until 2007 to adopt its first national IP framework and prioritise some sectors for 
development.  
 
Similarly, trade policy in South Africa closely followed and supported IP objectives. During 
the import substitution phase, the country pursued a more protectionist trade policy. The 
same applied with adoption of neoliberal policies in the mid-1990s, which saw the country 
joining the WTO as a developed country and undertaking deeper cuts. In addition, South 
Africa negotiated trade agreements with the European Union, European Free Trade 
Association as well as within the Southern Africa Development Community. Therefore, the 
question that remains is whether South Africa has the trade policy space to pursue its 
industrialisation ambitions as outlined in the NIPF as well as in various iterations of the 
industrial policy action plan.  
 
The study reviewed various official policy documents as well as WTO Agreements. In 
addition, the study analysed the tariff policy in the country to check whether there is some 
“water” to increase tariff if need arises. The results have shown that although South Africa 
does have space to use its tariff policy at a sectoral level, analysis at HS6 has revealed that 
some tariff lines do not have “water” between applied and bound rate. This implies mainly to 
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sectors such as clothing, textile, and footwear. While sectors such as automotive and 
automotive components and white goods have significant “water’ between applied and bound 
tariff. 
 
Furthermore, the study found that WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures would not constrain industrial policy in South Africa as most of the incentives that 
the country provides to the private sector are not actionable. Exports subsidies have been 
outlawed but this does not impact on South Africa as the country discontinued them in the 
early 1990s. TRIMS make illegal some instruments such as enforcing local content on 
foreign direct investments as well as export requirements. Therefore, TRIMS have eroded 
policy space for South Africa to impose restrictions on FDI.   
 
South Africa has relied on Government procurement to pursue its IP objectives through 
Preferential Public Procurement Framework Act (PPPFA) and Government has outlined 
some subsector for local procurement by state-owned enterprises as well as local content of 
such products.  South Africa is not a member to the Plurilateral Agreement on Government 
Procurement; consequently the country can and should use government procurement to 
pursue industrial development.  
 
Therefore, the WTO is indeed constraining policy space for the country to pursue its 
industrial policy. Nevertheless, Government procurement offers some option for the country 
but it alone may not be “enough”. South Africa should continue to exploit the policy space 
available in the SCM to support its priority sector on improve their competitiveness.  
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Appendix 1 Tariff phase-down under the WTO 
Description 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
3 Textiles 30.1 33.8 31.8 24.9 23.4 21.9 20.3 18.7 17.3 17.3 17.3 
4 Clothing, excl. 
footwear 73.7 73.6 68.2 54.6 50.5 46.4 42.4 37.7 33.2 33.2 33.2 
5 Leather and leather 
products  14.9 14.8 14.1 16.5 15.7 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.8 
6 Footwear  37.5 41.6 39.1 36.8 34.2 29.1 29.1 29.1 29.1 29.1 29.1 
7 Wood and wood 
products  13.9 3.6 3.4 3.5 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 
8 Paper and paper 
products  9.6 9.3 9.1 8.8 8.7 8.5 7.9 7.3 6.8 6.2 5.6 
9 Printing and 
publishing  8.1 1.3 1.2 1.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
10 Petroleum and 
petroleum products   1.6                     
11 Industrial chemicals  9.3 7.5 7.5 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 
12 Other chemical 
products  9 3.8 3.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
13 Rubber products  30.5 14.5 14.1 15.8 15.4 14.9 14.6 14.4 14 14 14 
14 Plastic products  19.8 14.7 13.7 13.2 12.6 12 12 12 12 12 12 
15 Glass and glass 
products  11.8 9.5 9 8.3 7.9 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 
16 Non-metallic mineral 
products  10.6 8.7 8.1 8.4 8 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 
17 Basic iron and steel 
products  7.6 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.1 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 
18 Non-ferrous metal 
products 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2 2 2 1.9 1.7 1.7 
19 Metal products, excl. 
machinery  13.1 8.2 7.8 7.8 7.6 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 
20 Non-electrical 
machinery 6.5 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
21 Electrical machinery  11 6.1 6 5.8 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 
22. Radio, television 
and communication 
apparatus 12.1 5.1 3.7 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 
23 Professional 
equipment etc.  7.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
24. Motor vehicles, 
parts and accessories 55.4 33.5 31.7 29.3 27.9 26.1 24.8 23.2 22.1 22.1 22.1 
25 Other transport 
equipment  1.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
26 Furniture  28.1 21.4 20.8 20.2 19.6 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 
27 Other manufacturing  2.9 1 1 5.2 5.1 5 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 
28 Mining 2.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Total 11.7 7.2 6.8 6.1 5.8 5.5 5.3 5.1 4.9 4.9 4.9 
Source: Cassim et al (2004) adopted from IDC 
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Appendix 2: Structure of South Africa’s MFN tariffs – 2000, 2008 and 2009/2010 
  2002 2008 2009 
1.    Bound tariff lines (% of all tariff lines) 98 98 98 
2.    Duty-free tariff lines (% of all tariff 
lines) 
43.4 54.1 56.5 (2010) 
3.    Non-ad valorem tariffs (% of all tariff 
lines) 
25.0 3.1 3.2 
4.    Tariff quotas (% of all tariff lines) 3.8 4.6 4.6 
5.    Non-ad valorem tariffs with no AVEs 
(% of all tariff lines) 
25.0 0.8 0.8 
6.    Simple average tariff rate 11.4 8.1 7.7 (2010) 
Agricultural products (WTO 
definition)
a
 
9.6 10.1 9.0 (2010) 
Non-agricultural products (WTO 
definition)
b
 
11.6 7.9 7.5 (2010) 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and 
fishing (ISIC 1) 
5.3 3.7 3.7 
Mining and quarrying (ISIC 2) 0.7 0.8 0.8 
Manufacturing (ISIC 3) 11.8 8.5 8.5 
7.    Domestic tariff "spikes" (% of all tariff 
lines)
c
 
3.9 8.5 8.5 
8.    International tariff "peaks" (% of all 
tariff lines)
d
 
34.8 20.8 20.8 
9.    Overall standard deviation of applied 
rates 
12.6 11.1 11.1 
10.   "Nuisance" applied rates (% of all 
tariff lines)
e
 
0.0 1.0 1.0 
Source: WTO – SACU 2009 Trade Policy Review; own calculations for 2010 
 
a WTO Agreement on Agriculture definitions. 
b Excluding petroleum. 
c Domestic tariff spikes are defined as those exceeding three times the overall simple average applied 
rate.  
d International tariff peaks are defined as those exceeding 15%. 
e Nuisance rates are those greater than zero, but less than or equal to 2%.  
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